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Abstract
The loan bills temporary credit facility was first implemented in May 2008, before the Global
Financial Crisis had truly hit Denmark. It continued to be utilized as part of a broader effort
to increase interbank lending after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The
objective of the loan bills scheme was to facilitate lending among financial institutions. Each
week, loan bills could be pledged as collateral for a seven-day loan from Denmark’s central
bank, Danmarks Nationalbank. One banking institution could borrow from another
institution by issuing a loan bill, and the institution buying the bill could raise liquidity by
using it as collateral for a loan from Danmarks Nationalbank. The buying institution could
also count the loan bill toward its statutory liquidity, as required by section 152 of the Danish
Financial Business Act. While reports show that the program may have helped improve
money market liquidity for some financial institutions, loan bills were not widely used. On
February 26, 2011, the credit facility for loan bills expired.
Keywords: Denmark, loan bill, temporary credit facility

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs.
1

Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
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At a Glance
The loan bills temporary credit facility was first
implemented in May 2008, before the Global Financial
Crisis had truly hit Denmark, and continued to be
utilized during the interbank market freeze after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers. The objective of the loan
bills scheme was to facilitate lending among the
institutions. Each week, loan bills could be pledged as
collateral for a seven-day loan from Denmark’s central
bank, Danmarks Nationalbank. A bank or mortgage
credit institute could borrow from another institution
by issuing a loan bill, and the institution buying the bill
could raise liquidity by using it as collateral for a loan
from Danmarks Nationalbank. The buying institution
could also count the loan bill toward its statutory
liquidity, as required by section 152 of the Danish
Financial Business Act.
Summary Evaluation

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To facilitate lending amongst financial
institutions to support liquidity for banks
Announcement
Date
Operational Date
End of Issuance
Window

May 23, 2008

Legal Authority

N/A

Peak Utilization

DKK 6 billion ($1 billion)
in loan bills issued; little
to no borrowing against
loan bills (exact number
pending)
Several (exact number
pending)
Danmarks Nationalbank

May 23, 2008
May 21, 2009
(initial)
Sep. 30, 2010 (second)
Feb. 26, 2011 (final)

While reports show that the program may have
helped improve money market liquidity for some
financial institutions, loan bills were not widely used. Participants
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others
have gone so far as to consider the loan bills scheme a Administrators
failure in addressing the needs of the Danish banking
sector. However, both the Danish government and critics agree that the lack of usage of
temporary credit facilities in Denmark was in part due to the more successful and more
widely used bank rescue packages that guaranteed interbank loans, five months later.
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Loan Bills Temporary Credit Facility: Denmark Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)

$355.62 billion in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)

$64,322 per capita in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4 2008:

Sovereign credit rating (5year senior debt)

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: AAAu
S&P: AAAu
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking system

$750.5 billion in total assets
Source: Bloomberg
211.04% in 2008

Size of banking system as
a percentage of GDP

Size of banking system as
a percentage of financial
system

Source: Bloomberg

Data not available for given year
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
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89% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
18% of total banking assets in 2008

Foreign involvement in
banking system

Government ownership of
banking system

Existence of deposit
insurance

Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
1% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and
Implications”
100% insurance on deposits up to $133,333 in 2010
Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, OECD
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Overview

Background
The loan bills temporary credit facility was first implemented in May 2008, before the Global
Financial Crisis and the interbank market freeze had truly hit Denmark. Confidence among
the institutions was still relatively high. However, financial institutions had become more
reluctant to lend to each other. Observing this phenomenon, Denmark’s central bank—
Danmarks Nationalbank—chose to approve a new type of security, the loan bill, as eligible
collateral for loans at the central bank.
This marked the first time Danmarks Nationalbank’s framework for credit operations was
adjusted in response to the Global Financial Crisis; however, it would be followed by more
changes in the next few months. During the interbank market freeze of September 2008,
Danmarks Nationalbank used additional monetary policy instruments to increase market
liquidity. These included adding a second temporary credit facility (the excess-capital
temporary credit facility, also known as the solvency scheme) and an expansion of the
collateral base to include more securities than were normally eligible as collateral for loans
from Danmarks Nationalbank.3 These steps were taken to “prevent solvent banks from
experiencing difficulties due to insufficient liquidity” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st Half, 18).
By the end of October 2008, the government would guarantee all bank liabilities, including
borrowing in the interbank market.
Program Description
The objective of the loan bills scheme was to facilitate lending among institutions. Every
Friday, loan bills could be pledged as collateral for a seven-day loan from Danmarks
Nationalbank. One banking institution could borrow from another institution by issuing a
loan bill, and the institution buying the bill could raise liquidity by using it as collateral for a
loan from Danmarks Nationalbank. The buying institution could also count the loan bill
toward its statutory liquidity, as required by section 152 of the Danish Financial Business
Act.
The introduction of loan bills was followed by the temporary expansion of the accepted
collateral base for loans from Danmarks Nationalbank to banking institutions and mortgagecredit institutes. The loan bills had to meet Danmarks Nationalbank’s standard terms. These
included requiring that loan bills were zero-coupon securities issued by banking institutions
in the Kingdom of Denmark. In addition, the maximum maturity for loan bills was set at one
year. The loan bills also had to be issued with VP Securities, Denmark’s central securities
depository, as the account controller. The collateral value was calculated as the nominal
value of the bills minus a haircut of 10 percent.
Initially, the interest rate for lending against loan bills was fixed as Danmarks Nationalbank’s
usual lending rate plus one percentage point. On October 7, 2008, the interest rate for loan
bills at Danmarks Nationalbank was changed to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate
3 During the financial crisis, the collateral base for loans from Danmarks Nationalbank

to financial institutions
was temporarily expanded to include special loan bills, quoted and unquoted shares, investment fund shares,
bank bonds with government guarantee, as well as SPV bonds issued on the basis of government-guaranteed
loans to the institutions (Financial Stability 2010, 66).
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plus two percentage points. The purpose of this adjustment was to align the terms and
conditions with the other temporary credit facilities. On March 13, 2009, the interest rate
was reduced to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus one percentage point, a
decision influenced by a downward trend in interest rates overall. On July 17, 2009, loan bills
were included in the temporary collateral basis, and the interest rate was abolished. The
purpose was to align the terms and conditions for pledging of unquoted unsecured debt with
government guarantees and loan bills.
The loan bills credit facility was initially set to expire on May 21, 2009. On November 11,
2008, the credit facility for loan bills was extended until September 30, 2010. The purpose
of this adjustment was to align the expiry dates of the temporary credit facilities. In April
2010, the temporary expansion of collateral basis (including loan bills) was extended to
February 26, 2011. On February 26, 2011, the credit facility for loan bills expired.
Outcomes
Loan bills were not widely issued. A 2009 Financial Stability report showed low issuance in
the facilities’ initial year of operation. Between DKK25 and DKK30 billion in loan bills were
issued overall; issuance peaked in October 2008, when about DKK16 billion were issued.
(See Figure 1) At the end of April 2009, Danish banking institutions had issued a total of
DKK6 billion in loan bills to other institutions (21).
Also by April 2009, no institutions had borrowed against loan bills from the central bank.
The 2009 report notes that this was part of a broader trend where securities eligible as part
of the temporary expanded collateral base were not used. Although the temporary facilities
(and corresponding expanded collateral policies) were supposed to help Danish institutions
meet liquidity requirements through alternative collateral, the use of these unconventional
collateral types was limited. Usual eligible assets continued to account for the vast majority
of the DKK332 billion in assets pledged as collateral for loans from Danmarks Nationalbank.
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Figure 1: Comparison of securities by issuance types (loan bills in bright orange).

Source: Financial Stability 2010, p. 65
The Danish government attributed this relative lack of temporary-credit-facilities usage to
the success of the Original Guarantee Scheme under Bank Package I. As a result of Bank
Rescue Package I, which guaranteed interbank loans, the “banking institutions started
lending to each other in the money market again” and the “need to borrow from Danmarks
Nationalbank [became] modest” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st Half, 21).
After the temporary expansion of collateral (including loan bills) expired in February 2011,
a partial reintroduction of the temporary collateral expansion was put into place on August
10, 2011. It allowed banks and mortgage-credit institutes to pledge certain shares in jointly
owned corporations as collateral with Danmarks Nationalbank. This new temporary
expansion of collateral expired on July 1, 2014.
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Key Design Decisions
1. May 23, 2008, Danmarks Nationalbank established its first temporary credit
facility in response to the Global Financial Crisis via the creation of loan bills.

Danmarks Nationalbank created this credit facility by expanding the collateral basis to
include a new type of security, the loan bill, which could be pledged as collateral to Danmarks
Nationalbank for loans on a weekly basis. Banks and mortgage-credit institutes were eligible
to participate in this seven-day loan.
2. The interest rate for the loan bills facility varied over time.
The interest rate was initially fixed as Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus one
percentage point. On October 7, 2008, the interest rate for loan bills at Danmarks
Nationalbank changed to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus two percentage
points. The purpose of this adjustment was to align the terms and conditions for all of
Denmark’s temporary credit facilities (the loan bills facility, the excess-capital facility, and
the other temporary expansion of collateral basis). On March 13, 2009, the interest rate was
reduced to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus one percentage point. A general
downward trend in interest rates influenced this decision. On July 17, 2009, loan bills were
included in the temporary collateral basis, and the interest was abolished.
3. The collateral value of loan bills was calculated as the nominal value of the bills
minus a haircut of 10 percent.
4. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority permitted loan bills to be included
as part of an institution’s statutory liquidity.
Because the institution buying the loan bill could later raise liquidity by using it as collateral
for a loan from Danmarks Nationalbank, the buying institution was permitted to include the
bill in its statutory liquidity under Section 152 of the Danish Financial Business Act, until one
month before the expiry of the facility.
5. The expiration date for the loan bills facility was extended twice.
The loan bills credit facility was initially set to expire on May 21, 2009. On November 11,
2008, the credit facility for loan bills was extended until September 30, 2010. The purpose
of this adjustment was to align the expiry dates of the temporary credit facilities. In April
2010, the option of pledging loan bills as collateral was extended to February 26, 2011.

III. Evaluation
The central bank said that the purpose of the loan bills facility was to spur interbank lending
rather than inject central bank liquidity: “Extensive use of the credit facility was not a
criterion of success” (Overview of Temporary Facilities, 1). Roughly DKK25-30 billion in loan
bills were issued in 2008-09. The IMF and other observers concluded that loan bills were not
widely used (Carstensen 2011, 108). In September 2008, just a few months after the loan
bills scheme was first implemented, the government created the excess-capital facility in
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part because of the failure of the loan-bill scheme to meet banking needs that were
intensified after the fall of Lehman Brothers. In October, the government guaranteed bank
debt, including interbank debt, obviating the need for the program.
A 2009 report from Danmarks Nationalbank elaborates on its disappointment with the
program, noting that the loan-bill scheme “assume[d] that the banking institutions want to
lend to each other,” however, “confidence among the banking institutions weakened during
the summer of 2008 as the scope of the problems in the financial sector became more
apparent” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st Half, 19). The purpose of the excess-capital facility
in particular was to prevent banking institutions with adequate capital from incurring
liquidity problems as a result of insufficient assets, which could be pledged as collateral to
Danmarks Nationalbank. Unlike the loan-bill scheme, the excess-capital scheme was meant
to help institutions access loans raised directly from Danmarks Nationalbank—not from
other banks. To achieve this, the excess-capital facility allowed Danmarks Nationalbank to
offer uncollateralised credit in the form of credit line, the value of which depended on the
applying institutions’ excess capital adequacy (Financial Stability 2009, 1st Half, 20). The
credit line could be counted toward the institution’s statutory liquidity requirement
(Financial Stability 2010, 66).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has noted that the loan bills scheme was
unsuccessful in part because “it failed to address banks’ strong liquidity preference and
aversion to counterparty risk” (IMF 2008, 12-13). Others have argued that the temporary
credit facilities in general had limited usage because Denmark was simultaneously
experiencing a currency crisis. The combination of not being a Eurozone member and having
a fixed exchange rate regime may have led to high demand for euro and dollar liquidity by
Danish banks, and increasing pressure on the Danish krone (Woll 2014, 158). As a result,
monetary policy instruments used by the Danish central bank had less of an impact on the
banking industry than the instruments used in the United States or UK (Woll 2014, 158). The
Danish government has also attributed this relative lack of temporary-credit-facilities usage
to the success of the Original Guarantee Scheme under Bank Package I. They argue that as a
result of Bank Rescue Package I, the “banking institutions started lending to each other in
the money market again” and the “need to borrow from Danmarks Nationalbank [became]
modest” (Financial Stability 2009 1st half, 21).
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